Big is not always beautiful

WRITERS on public administration used to refer to Parkinson’s Law, which holds that a bureaucracy is inherently a self-enlarging creation. A unit of five functionaries, including a supervisor, to do a relatively small job may be set up. Before long, it will take on unnecessary chores and start claiming that it is overworked and understaffed.

The supervisor will want a deputy who in turn will want an assistant, and fairly soon the organisation will have increased to three times its original size. It will also have become unwieldy, less efficient and wasteful.

The same tendency works in bureaucracies outside the public sector, including political parties which, even if they have little to do, will create an army of office bearers. Posts and designations are created and awarded because men of substance will not join a party simply to promote the good of the order. They want to be able to show the folks back home that the world outside recognises their importance and value.

Witness the recent formation of central and provincial governments (cabinets) in this country. In addition to a head (prime minister or chief minister), they have senior ministers, regular ministers, ministers of state, a variety of advisors and parliamentary secretaries.

The central government following the 2002 election consisted of more than 60 ministers. The existing departments, not numerous enough to take in all of the aspirants, were chopped up into segments named ‘divisions’, to accommodate legislators whose support was needed but who would not lend support unless they were made ministers.

This practice continues even after the election of Feb 18, which was thought to have wrought radical change in the nation’s political culture. Those who emerged as winners laid claim to self-denial, insisting that they were not covetous of offices, and that they would support the government of the day if it was doing the right thing and criticise it only to show the right way. But this was mostly pretence. In fact, they all wanted jobs if they could have them. Even Maulana Fazlur Rahman’s JUI, which has only six members in the National Assembly, got away with one ministry in the central government. If the PML-Q is occupying the opposition benches, it is due to the want of an option.

This is not to say that the quest for public office and the accompanying fun is wicked. It is one of the ends of the competitive pursuit of power called democracy. A politician gets office if his party, having received the popular mandate to govern, chooses to give him one. But it is unethical for him, or even for his party, to sell its support to others to enable them to form a government. This unethical practice is still going on. It goes by the name of ‘power sharing’ and, to make it sound chaste, ‘reconciliation’.

If I may be allowed a slight digression, I should like to submit that the term, ‘reconciliation’, is being used loosely in the current political discourse. Reconciliation may be brought about between parties that have been enemies, parties at war. It is irrelevant to rivals in the game of democratic politics. There can be no democracy if there are no rivals. Opponents may quit being opponents for a time and come together in a power-sharing arrangement. But if all players come into the same team, there will be no game or, let us say, match.

Having won a solid majority in the Sindh Assembly, the PPP could have formed a viable government without the aid of others. Mr Asif Zardari, professedly moved by the spell of national reconciliation, wanted to take the MQM as a partner in the provincial government. Negotiations to settle the number of ministries and portfolios the MQM would get ensued and went through many rounds.

Not getting as much as they wanted, the MQM negotiators, claimed to be disenchanted with the PPP’s attitude and broke off the talks. But they were soon persuaded to return to the table and, on April 30, concluded an agreement, which gave them 13 out of 34 ministries (a number which is now said to have reached 52).

In pre-independence India, a provincial cabinet hardly ever exceeded 10 members and it worked well. The government of Sindh does not have to comprise 52 ministers (reports say more of them are on the way). A cabinet of 15 divided between the two parties on a nine to six basis would have been quite adequate. The tendency to think that big government is the more desirable is not unique to Sindh. The government in Balochistan could have done with five ministers but it ended up with more than 30. The same tendency has been at work in Punjab.

These governments include departments such as culture, youth affairs, technical education, public health engineering, environment, religious affairs, minority affairs, human rights, tourism in addition to the traditional and well-established portfolios. It may be assumed that politicians want to be ministers because they will then have power and the gratifications it brings. There is power to be exercised if one is a minister in charge of law and order, finance, commerce and industry, education, health, agriculture, possibly among others. But I do not see that there is any power to exercise in departments of religious affairs, youth affairs, culture, tourism, protection of minorities, human rights.

Why would then anyone want to be minister for tourism or youth affairs? There is no power here but the post still carries numerous benefits for the holder in addition to a substantial salary and allowances, such as private secretaries and personal assistants, healthcare, free furnished housing and domestic servants, several chauffer-driven automobiles, escorts, foreign trips to attend conferences on esoteric subjects , unlimited access to long distance telephone, media exposure and enhanced prestige among constituents back home.

These advantages and comforts are not to be dismissed lightly. It is surely more fulfilling to be a minister for youth affairs, with no work and a lot of fun, than to be only a neglected backbencher in the legislature.

I am not saying that none of those who become ministers have an interest in serving the public interest. But it is my impression that in far too many instances the primary objective is not as much to serve the people as it is to obtain personal gratification at their expense.

ANP and its antecedents

THERE was once a political party named the Awami League, based largely in East Pakistan and headed by Maulana Bhashani. In February 1957 it split because of differences between him and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy over issues of foreign policy.

Bhashani and the leftist contingent in the party left and in July formed the National Awami Party (NAP).

It included a number of politicians from West Pakistan, notably Abdul Wali Khan, Mian Iftikharuddin, Abdul Majid Sindhi and Mahmudul Haq Osmani. It stood for full autonomy for both East and West Pakistan, non-alignment in foreign policy and parliamentary democracy. It remained united and moderately active in national politics for about 10 years, but then in November 1967 it split again. Abdul Wali Khan became the leader of a pro-Moscow faction while Maulana Bhashani headed a pro-Chinese group. In post-1971 Pakistan, Mr Bhutto’s government banned NAP. It re-emerged in 1986 with a slightly different name, that is the Awami National Party (ANP).

Abdul Wali Khan (d.2006), first president of the ANP, was a seasoned politician, widely respected for his candour and integrity. As he grew old and fragile, his wife Nasim directed the party for a few years, and his son Asfandyar Wali Khan has been its president since 1999. He appears to have inherited his father’s self-esteem, sense of personal honour, dedication to the Pakhtun identity and, presumably, his political ethic.

Born in February 1949 at Charsadda, Asfandyar Wali received his early education at Aitchison College in Lahore, a BA degree from the University of Peshawar, and somewhere along the line a master’s degree in business administration. Like his grandfather (Abdul Ghaffar Khan; d. 1988) and his father, he does not seem to have ever worked for a living. He may have inherited a good deal of property and wealth.

Asfandyar Wali was active in student politics, joined groups that opposed Ayub Khan and later Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He was arrested, along with several ANP politicians, tried and convicted by a special tribunal in Hyderabad jail, and sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years. Gen Ziaul Haq released him and some of the others in 1978. He was elected a member of the NWFP Assembly in 1990 and a member of the National Assembly three years later. He lost in 1997, but was elected senator in 2003 for a six-year term and, once again, an MNA in February 2008.

Asfandyar Wali regards all Pakhtuns, including those from Afghanistan who came and settled in the tribal areas on the Pakistani side, as one people. He and his party are dedicated to promoting their well-being. He wants the tribal belt to be politically integrated with the NWFP. The fact that the Taliban, who have been killing his people, are also Pakhtuns puts him in a difficult position.

Initially he advocated means other than military force for dealing with them. His attitude has radically changed following the recent suicide bombing at his own doorstep in Charsadda and an attack on Amir Haider Hoti’s home in Mardan. He now wants to make sure that the generals and the government in Islamabad are determined enough in their campaign to eradicate the Taliban.

The ANP has maintained a significant presence in the legislatures. Of the 80 seats in the NWFP assembly, it won ten in the 1988 election, 23 in 1990, 18 in 1993 and 32 in 1997. The number of seats in the assembly increased to 124 just before the 2002 election. It is well known that this election was rigged to the advantage of the ANP’s opponents, especially the Islamic parties, and the party ended up with only seven seats that year. It emerged as the largest party in the house following the elections of 2008 and formed the government in coalition with the PPP.

The party has all along shown a bias in favour of socialism, but more as political theory than as a controlling framework for policymaking. In any case it stands to the left of centre in its policy preferences. Note also that it has always been unambiguously secular-minded. It opposes Al Qaeda, the Taliban and all expressions of religious fundamentalism and extremism. It is Asfandyar Wali Khan’s and his party’s avowed mission to counter and defeat these movements which they fear are spreading to settled districts of the NWFP and parts of Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab.

The ANP claims to be, and I think it actually is, a liberal, progressive and modernising force in Pakistan. It is committed to democracy (holds regular internal party elections) and social justice. Being the ruling party in the NWFP at the present time (in coalition with the PPP), it will have the opportunity to improve the lives of the poor. Let us see what it does.

The party is well known for its espousal of provincial autonomy and the right of the various nationalities in the country to preserve and promote their languages and cultures. The matter of nationalities was associated with the ANP’s parent organisation, NAP, in the 1960s. Its proponents distinguished nationality from the nation state which, they said, is often composed of distinct linguistic and cultural groups, each with a historic identity that it cherishes and wants to preserve. This kind of thinking does not alarm us today but it was not well received by the centralising regimes in the 1960s.

The issue of provincial autonomy is as old as the state itself. Most of our political parties advocate it, albeit in varying measure. There is, however, no consensus on its dimensions. Some of the ‘nationalists’ in Sindh and Balochistan would allow the federation nothing more than partial charge of defence and foreign affairs, deny it revenue-raising authority and make it dependent on subventions from the provinces. This is an extreme position which most other parties would avoid. As far as I know, the ANP has never spelled out how much of provincial autonomy would be good enough.

It should be noted that, as in the case of many other parties in the subcontinent, a specific family’s predominance in the ANP’s affairs gives it a dynastic character. Abdul Wali Khan was its first president, then came his wife Begum Nasim who was followed by her son Asfandyar. The newly elected chief minister of the NWFP, Amir Haider Khan Hoti, is Asfandyar Wali’s nephew. He is a 36-year-old man whom the party’s executive committee chose in preference to Bashir Ahmed Bilour, a veteran politician and a long-time party stalwart.

Advocacy of change

OPTIMISTIC about human ingenuity and creativity, the liberal disposition is not reluctant to change its surroundings because it believes that the existing order of things can be replaced by more satisfactory arrangements.

The conservative, on the other hand, believes that the status quo has resulted from the exertions of uncounted generations, each having built on the accomplishments of its predecessors. It cannot be replaced by a given set of individuals. If something has broken down, he will tinker with it, fix it, not throw it out.

It is common knowledge that many Americans are sick and tired of their present situation: rising prices, fewer jobs and shrinking wages, want of access to adequate healthcare and quality education, mounting unpaid bills, the danger of losing one’s home because of inability to make mortgage payments. Many millions of people in this country, presumably the richest in the world, do not have enough to eat. This situation has resulted from President Bush’s wrong policies and actions, the war in Iraq which costs $10bn every month, tax cuts for the wealthy and neglect of the majority’s pressing needs. America wants change.

Many political observers believe that, if elected, John McCain, the Republican candidate for president and a firm conservative, may make some peripheral changes but will for the most part retain Bush’s socio-economic outlook and policies. Mr McCain and his supporters want to dispel this image and insist that he is not another Bush. His running mate, Sarah Palin, has been calling him a change-maker, indeed a “maverick”. But this claim does not have many takers.

McCain, convinced that the free market economy is superior to other systems, will let it take its course without letting the government come in its way. He will reduce taxes on the wealthy on the reasoning that this will enable them to expand existing enterprises and establish new ones, all of which will create many new jobs. He will leave it to each individual to provide for his retirement, healthcare and education with minimal contribution from his employer or the government. He thinks this is upholding freedom of choice.

If elected, Barack Obama, a liberal and the Democratic candidate, is likely to make significant departures from President Bush’s dispensation. He will work to raise taxes on the wealthy and lower them for small businesses and middle-class individuals, extend health insurance to all Americans, improve public schools and make college education affordable for all those who want it, develop new sources of energy, build infrastructure, encourage local manufacturing of hybrid automobiles, withdraw troops from Iraq within a specified period of time, fight and defeat Al Qaeda and Taliban militants in Afghanistan and, if necessary, in Pakistan’s tribal regions, and open talks with heads of foreign governments currently opposed to America (such as Iran’s).

He favours government regulation of the economy to keep the barons of commerce and industry from exploiting their workers and robbing consumers, and to check reckless operations of the kind that have brought on the current financial crisis. He will extend regulation to all those domains where the public interest requires it.

Predictions of election results can go wrong. I remember that on the presidential election day in America in November 1948, pollsters, newspapers and radio stations expected Governor Thomas Dewey of New York, the Republican nominee, to be the winner. But after the vote count had been completed later that night, it transpired that President Harry Truman was going to remain in office for another four years.

Polls show that Obama is ahead of McCain. It is conceivable that a majority of voters will act contrary to the general expectation, but the likelihood is that Obama will be declared the winner on the evening of Nov 4. Some advances in bringing about the changes he has been promising may then be made. This will require enabling legislation which is the province of Congress. If the coming elections return a Democratic majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, Congress will probably provide the needed legislative support. America will then be a nicer place to belong to and live in.

Change denoting something new should be distinguished from reform that comes from making the existing arrangements work more effectively. In a place like Pakistan both systemic change and reform are needed. The police and numerous other enforcement agencies are already in place and so is the relevant legislation. But domestic security and tranquillity are nowhere to be found because the law enforcers are not doing their job. They are incompetent, lazy, poorly paid or otherwise unmotivated to make the necessary exertions.

The same holds for all other departments of public affairs. Let us, for further illustration, take the case of our ‘sovereign’ parliament whose members have been insisting that they should be the ones to settle all major issues of policy. The two houses were recently called to a joint session to consider the grave threat to national security posed by extremists and militants and tell the government how to deal with it. They met for a number of days, heard a briefing from a general and another from Ms Sherry Rehman, the minister for information.

The opposition members complained that the briefings did not tell them anything they did not already know from reading the newspapers. But they did not say what it was that they wanted to know. On most of the days after the briefings the great majority of parliamentarians stayed away from the house. Over and over again the speaker had to adjourn the proceedings because less than 60 or so of the 442 members of the joint session were present. This state of affairs may have given outsiders the impression that parliament had no interest in being sovereign.

Beyond the more effective working of existing arrangements, there is the matter of making systemic changes. The parliamentary system of government is generally accepted. Remaining within its bounds, one may argue that the Senate should have the same authority and power as does the National Assembly. Then there is the persistent demand for provincial autonomy. All political parties endorse it but none of them has ever done anything to implement it when in power. The culture of Pakistani politicians does not require them to actually do what they have been pronouncing desirable. Those in the ruling elite do not want to be change-makers because the status quo suits their personal and class interests.

Reason to be optimistic

POLITICAL development in Pakistan is going well, and the signs I see suggest that it is going to get even better. We witnessed an intriguing event on Feb 18, an election that was generally regarded as fair and honest. Its results were accepted with a good heart even by most of the losers.

This is, in retrospect, an almost unprecedented achievement. Regardless of where the credit for it belongs, the nation has to be grateful for the end result.

In the months preceding the election, the political environment in the country improved. Traditional rivals, who had harassed each other when in power, resolved never to do it again. They shook hands and undertook to work together for the restoration of democracy and related institutions to the exclusion of military interventions.

Their parties, the PPP and PML-N, have joined hands and taken in a few of the smaller parties, to form coalition governments at the centre and in some of the provinces. It took a good deal of negotiating to settle the specifics of power-sharing, but it has been done amicably. The unanimous election of Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani as prime minister, and that of Mr Amir Haider Hoti as chief minister of the NWFP, were greeted as history-making events. Indications are that the ruling coalition can muster a two-thirds majority in a joint session of the two houses of parliament so as to be able to pass constitutional amendments.

The coalition partners intend to reinstate the judges whom Gen Musharraf had removed on Nov 3, 2007. The procedure for undoing his high-handedness may turn out to be tedious but the needful, I think, will be done before long. That too should be a welcome development. What will the reinstated judges do if the validity of Musharraf’s election as president is called into question again? If they hold it to have been invalid, the current balance of governance may be thrown into disarray. This could be a turn of events that Mr Gilani and his party would like to avoid. The judges might then be persuaded to leave the general alone. Pervez Musharraf may then continue to live in the president’s mansion, limited to the very modest role the constitution assigns him. Such an outcome would also be acceptable to the military.

The newly elected speaker and party leaders in the National Assembly expect that attendance, seriousness of purpose, quality of debate, and observance of rules and procedures will all show a big improvement over the previous years. It is heartening that Prime Minister Gilani wants to energise the assembly as an institution. He intends to bring not only proposed legislation but all major policy issues to the house for its consideration. He has reportedly told the visiting American officials that parliament, and not he alone, will review and finalise this country’s anti-terrorism strategy and operations. This was the right stand for him to have taken even if it did not please the visitors.

An era of goodwill would seem to have begun in Pakistan. I sense a change in the outlook of the generality of people on politics. On Feb 18 they rejected the old regime and its ways. The politicians seem to have noticed the public’s new frame of mind, which may explain why the Chaudhries and their cohorts are telling us that they will not be an obstructionist opposition, and that they will even applaud the new government when it is doing the right thing. Various political leaders had for years advocated the supremacy of parliament in the country’s governance. Their quest, it seems, is about to be fulfilled.

Parties of different hues are ready to work together to serve the nation in these difficult times. They have placed ideology on the back seat to do tasks that must and can be done, recognising that politics is the art of the possible. They have not demanded a price for their cooperation. The JUI and MQM did eventually get ministerial posts, but note that they had offered the ruling coalition their support unconditionally.

Pessimists, unwilling to concede that anything good and decent can happen in Pakistan, have been asking how long it can be before the ruling coalition falls apart and the country returns to chaos and political instability. They think constructive cooperation, unless ordered by a common superior, is foreign to our political culture. Past experience would seem to confirm their interpretation. But note that the culture of authoritarianism prevailed in much of the world until about a couple of hundred years ago. It gave way to a different culture, that of democracy, as the socio-economic environment of politics changed. The process of change was gradual but change did come. Something of the same order may be happening in Pakistan. Its political culture is changing with changing times.

It should be noted also that the principals in the ruling coalition, the PPP and PML-N, did not have an alternative to working together. They stood to gain a lot more by sticking with each other than they possibly could by going their separate ways. This, I think, will remain the case and I anticipate that their togetherness will last for quite a few years.

One should not, however, ignore the lingering dark patches of cloud on this otherwise bright and sunny day. Democratisation of the internal working of our major political parties remains elusive. Witness the long and mysterious process by which the PPP leadership chose its nominee for the prime minister’s post. A straightforward procedure would have been for Mr Zardari to call a meeting of the PPP MNAs, call for nominations, ask each nominee to state his credentials, and then put the matter to vote. The person getting the largest number of votes should have been designated the party’s candidate for the post.

This is not how it was done. Ms Benazir Bhutto was said to have named Makhdoom Amin Fahim as her choice before she was assassinated. Apparently, Mr Zardari did not like her choice and set it aside. The party’s central executive committee, in a show of submissiveness, ‘authorised’ him to settle the matter as he might deem fit. It took him more than four weeks to identify the ‘fit’ candidate.

He embarked on a long series of consultations with groups of PPP MNAs from all over the country. One cannot say whether these were genuine consultations rather than a pretence. During all this time he kept Amin Fahim guessing as to his intentions. Much to his subsequent embarrassment, Mr Fahim kept insisting, until almost the last day, that he was a serious candidate for the job. Mr Zardari, on his part, kept his decision a closely guarded secret to be revealed on the day the assembly would elect the leader of the house. As if this thorough personalisation of the party’s decision-making was not enough, he called in his and Benazir’s 19-year-old son, the PPP ‘chairman’, to endorse Yusuf Raza Gilani as the party’s candidate for the prime minister’s office.

Want of accountability

PRICES of oil, gas, electricity, food and many other items of daily consumption have risen enormously. Millions of people are going hungry, and there are reports every day of persons killing themselves and their families because they had nothing to eat.

The economy is languishing and workers are losing jobs. The ‘common man’ is being asked to tighten his belt.

But those calling for the tightening of belts are doing nothing of the kind in their own domains. On July 7 Prime Minister Gilani journeyed to Malaysia to attend a conference of eight developing Muslim countries called the D8. It was all right for him to show up there but it was something else to have taken with him an entourage of 55 persons, including numerous parliamentarians.

The conference passed resolutions in the nature of pious platitudes. It resolved to meet global challenges through “innovative cooperation”. Participants cautioned the world that food shortage could pose a threat to its peace and good order. They favoured collaboration, including joint ventures, between members to increase food production and identify and develop renewable sources of energy including the nuclear variety. They resolved to increase intra-regional trade, allow movement of labour and the protection of migrant workers’ rights. They would “harness the potential of Islamic banking and finance”. Prime Minister Gilani appealed to the D8 members and the world at large to help Pakistan’s fight against extremism and militancy.

These resolutions were statements of good intentions placed on record. How seriously they were meant and whether any of them will actually be carried out only time will tell. Their articulation could not possibly have required any significant amount of intellectual ingenuity or exertion. There was then no call for the 55 Pakistani dignitaries to make a contribution to the work of this conference, because it did no work to speak of.

The cost of their travel, hotel accommodation, food and drink, local transportation and daily allowance would add up to several million rupees that the Pakistani taxpayer had to pay. He got nothing in return, for these gentlemen brought back nothing (except perhaps stories of their exploits in Kuala Lumpur). And he has no way of holding them accountable.

While Mr Gilani was still in Kuala Lumpur, Asif Zardari asked him to stop over at Dubai for consultation about the status of their party’s coalition with the PML-N and other matters. Mr Zardari had also summoned several federal ministers to Dubai to help him get ready for his forthcoming talks with Nawaz Sharif in London.

The prime minister and his cabinet colleagues are functionaries of the state, and if they had gone to Dubai on government business they could have justly charged their expenses to the treasury. But they went to see Mr Zardari who holds no public office. He may be their party boss but in the reckoning of the Auditor General of Pakistan he is a private citizen. It follows that the ministers’ visit to Dubai was their private business, the costs of which should have been met out of their personal funds. But it is lawlessness if they were paid out of the treasury.

Mr Zardari’s present connection with the government is not only extra-legal but also gross. If it cannot be terminated, a way should be found to legitimise it. He might be given some kind of a post in the state apparatus: roving ambassador, minister without portfolio, adviser-in-chief?

He is not the only party chief who summons associates to meetings requiring travel within Pakistan and abroad. Benazir Bhutto used to call her party elders to Dubai, London and at times even New York. Nawaz Sharif did the same with his party notables. One may want to know who paid their travel and related costs: each one of them personally, the party chief, or the party?

There is not much for us to say in the first two cases. Interesting questions do arise if the money comes from the party coffers. I happen to have on hand approximate figures (in rupees) of income and expenditure that several parties reported to the Election Commission for the fiscal year 2003-04. The MQM collected and spent nearly Rs4m; the PML-Q collected Rs256,000 and spent nearly Rs6m; the JI received Rs3m and spent a little less; the PML-N collected and spent a little less than Rs2m; the JUI-F collected and spent exactly the same amount which was Rs1,138,408 (this exactitude being surely a thing of wonder). The PPP parliamentarians opened and closed the year with a cash balance of Rs1,000, collected nothing and spent nothing (also an enigma).

If four PML-N notables made three trips to London to confer with Nawaz Sharif, travelled first (or even business) class and stayed in a decent hotel, they would pretty much exhaust the party’s kitty (Rs2m in 2003-04). Note that Mr Sharif asked his associates to travel to London several times during his stay there. The same would hold for other parties such as the MQM and PPP.

Consider also that parties have other expenses such as those relating to workers’ compensation, organisation of election campaigns, public meetings, rallies and demonstrations. We must conclude then that the reports filed with the Election Commission were incomplete or false, and that the parties have additional funds tucked away in hidden places.

It is possible that the better-known persons in the major parties are independently wealthy and capable of bearing their travel costs, in which case we have the paradox of the wealthy managing a party, such as the PPP, that claims to be the party of the poor and the deprived.

It may be assumed that parties have bank accounts in which their declared funds are kept. It remains to be asked if there is a unit in each party that approves its budget and authorises disbursements, and to which the designated disbursing officer renders an accounting. If that is not the case, are we to assume that the party president or chairman is the keeper of its funds and disburses them as he deems fit? Needless to say, the latter situation does not provide for accountability. It may then be said that the party chooses to operate on the basis of a personality cult, and that it has little interest in converting itself into an institution.

Mr Zardari’s US visit – DAWN

ASIF Ali Zardari was in America a week or so ago. I happened to watch a television talk show in which the host asked several prominent Pakistani observers how they assessed the significance of his visit.

They wanted to emphasise that this was not an official visit to the United States, and that he had come to address the United Nations General Assembly. I have no idea what he would have done during an ‘official’ visit that he did not do this time.

The participants in this TV show thought his address to the General Assembly, one of 32 delivered by visiting heads of government that day, did not go well. He mentioned Pakistan’s major problems only in passing. He wanted to talk mainly of himself and his family. He placed a large picture of Benazir Bhutto on the rostrum where all could see it, spoke of his abiding love for her and his dedication to her legacy. He announced, to the puzzlement of his listeners, that only the ‘Benazir doctrine’ (of which they had never heard) could solve the world’s problems in the 21st century. He said he had come to the United Nations looking for justice which must be done by the appointment of a commission to investigate Ms Bhutto’s assassination. This was a bad speech, unbecoming of a president, and one that did nothing for his country.

During this visit to the UN and other places, Mr Zardari took on the mission of introducing himself to world leaders who happened to be present. Second, he wanted them to know that democracy had arrived in Pakistan, that the country now had a democratic government, that the transition to democracy had been completed with his own election as president, and that all of this should be good news to the world. The interviewees on the talk show thought he should also tell his audiences about Pakistan’s central role in the war against terror, and the fact that its economy was close to collapse, and that the world must come to its assistance.

There is no convincing explanation of why Mr Zardari came to address the General Assembly. As far as I can tell, presidents who are heads of the executive back home came but those who are heads of state did not. Manmohan Singh came as prime minister, not president, of India. Many other prime ministers were present, and in some cases lesser officials represented their countries.

That Mr Zardari got to shake hands with a certain number of foreign dignitaries may have made him feel good but it cannot be said to have brought any gains to Pakistan. Government officials as well as the people of important western and Asian countries may have some interest in Pakistan, but it is unlikely that they want to know Mr Zardari (unless his lavish praise of Gov Sarah Palin’s beauty and his offer to embrace her tickled their fancy). Note also that several of our heads of state (Nazimuddin, Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, Chaudhry Fazal Ilahi, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar) were little known outside Pakistan and no harm resulted to the country from that fact.

Democracy has come to Pakistan primarily because the generality of its people, print and electronic media, lawyers and judges, and other organs of civil society wanted it. Mr Zardari has had nothing to do with its arrival. Pakistan has done itself good by readmitting democracy, but in doing so it has not done the world a favour over which it should rejoice.

Mr Zardari does not have the credentials to present himself as a champion of democracy. He makes all of the important decisions for the PPP, and the party notables do his bidding. He advocates the supremacy of the constitution and sovereignty of parliament. In a parliamentary system the prime minister and his cabinet propose policies to parliament and manage the government’s day-to-day business. But Mr Zardari directs this country’s governance in violation of its constitution. If he is a democrat, he is one in some weird sense of the term unknown to most of us.

Mr Zardari asks the world to help Pakistan in its fight against terrorism. The world knows that terrorism poses horrendous threats to this country’s peace and security. The government has a very tough time combating it. American incursions into Pakistan’s tribal territory to hit the Taliban’s hiding places are condemned as violations of its sovereignty. The government and people of Pakistan want these American moves to stop. America should leave it to the Pakistani security forces to eradicate the militants operating in its territory. This sounds reasonable. If American intelligence agencies have information about the militants’ location on Pakistani territory, they could share it with their Pakistani counterparts, who would then go and hit these hideouts. American officials are reluctant to go this way because, as some of them have said publicly more than once, they suspect that there are pro-Taliban elements in the Pakistani intelligence agencies that will pass on this information to the militants. The latter will then move away to other places.

The presence of pro-Taliban elements in the ‘agencies’ is something to which Pakistani newspaper commentaries have also periodically referred. Mr Zardari should determine the truth of this matter. If pro-Taliban elements do exist but cannot be thrown out, the position being taken with the Americans should perhaps be reconsidered. Alternatively, Mr Zardari’s government may want to re-evaluate its modes of participation in the war against terror. These aspects of the situation should frankly and truthfully be placed before the parliament and the people. Will Mr Zardari do it?

The world is being asked to pull Pakistan out of its currently disastrous economic situation. Its spokesmen say it needs an immediate infusion of $10 to15bn, and that is to start with. The country is incurring huge budget and trade deficits. Mr Zardari has no expertise in economic management that would enable him to identify the follies that have brought the country to the brink of a ‘meltdown’. Nor does he know specifically what his government must do to help the nation’s economy recover beyond any help that the outside world may give.

His recent visit to America, with an entourage of some 60 persons, must have cost millions. It would help if he cancelled all planned foreign trips. The hazards to the country they carry would reduce if he just stayed home.

Balancing ends and means – DAWN

I CAN speak of matters in the realm of economics only as a layman. In hopes of improving my mind, I went to a meeting of economists at the Lahore School of Economics the other day. Dr Shamshad Akhtar, governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, was the principal speaker.

A lively discussion followed her presentation. Referring to our unbounded consumerism, spurred on by the easy availability of credit in this country, I asked if she intended to apply the brakes on the flow of credit. She did not, because she thought easy access to credit had improved the quality of life of many Pakistanis.

Her view may have merit from an economist’s perspective. One may say, for instance, that if women stopped buying things they did not need, the economies of the world, especially those of the highly developed societies, would come crashing down. But surely there are perspectives other than those of the proponents of capitalism. Quality of life is a subject open to interpretation.

I propose to present here my reading of the current urges to spend on the part of both individuals and public authorities and the styles of personal living and governance they call into being. People buy things they need. Needs vary from one person to the next, and from one situation to another. Genuineness of needs for the basic amenities of life can probably be verified and their limits determined. The happiness people expect from the fulfilment of their needs or wants is an ethereal state of mind. Different things or experiences make different persons, and the same person in different situations, happy.

These reservations notwithstanding, it seems to me that Pakistani culture is increasingly being monetised. People honour one another not so much for one’s attainments in arts and sciences and the professions as for the largeness of one’s material possessions. They compete with one another to demonstrate that they are just as well, or even better, endowed in this respect. A woman’s worth is judged largely by the brand name and estimated price of the handbag she carries and the shoes she wears.

I understand that a simple three-piece suit of clothes for women (shalwar, kameez and dupatta) can be had for as little as 300 rupees. (It looks pretty good to me.) Its defect is that maids and cleaning women can afford to buy and wear it. The ‘begums’ cannot be seen wearing the kind of outfits that their servants wear. If they want to maintain their higher status they will wear a known designer’s suits, carried by fancy boutiques, whose cost runs into thousands. They must consider what ladies in their peer group will think of them and say if they did any less.

I have no objection to high living on the part of those who can afford it and whose priorities include constructive pursuits beyond conspicuous consumption. I cherish the memory of Mr M.A. Jinnah and my admiration for him does not diminish because he spent a great deal of money on maintaining an elegant style of living. It pleases me that he was one of the world’s best-dressed men. But he did not borrow money to meet his expenses. He was wealthy, and he not only lived well but gave money to universities and charitable institutions. I admire M.K. Gandhi for his virtues and accomplishments but not for the fact that he went around in nothing more than a wraparound.

In sum I object not to living well but to living beyond one’s means. The culture of living on loans is not limited to Pakistan. It is spreading everywhere. Banks are in the business of lending money. If people did not borrow and pay interest on the loans they had taken out, banks would not be able to meet their operating costs: they would go under. They compete with one another in offering potential borrowers inducements to borrow from them.

Credit card companies do the same; many of them are willing to give you borrowing facility even if your credit rating is poor. Stores offer you merchandise on credit with no instalment payments due until a year after the date of purchase. A substantial part of many a citizen’s income goes towards the payment of interest on loans. The same kind of culture is making its way into Pakistan.

Public authorities are doing a lot worse than private individuals in respect of money management. Open-ended borrowing has become their norm at all levels — federal, provincial, and local. The federal government’s budget deficits run into hundreds of billions of rupees. Even when there is no money in its account with the State Bank, it keeps writing cheques which the Bank has to pay. These payments become part of the government’s domestic debt which is now counted in trillions.

The Bank keeps printing money to meet the government’s unending demands. The more money it prints for the government to throw into the market, the higher goes the rate of inflation which, according to some estimates, will soon reach 20 per cent. As prices of the necessities of life increase further, the poor will become poorer and more miserable than they are already.

In the mid-1950s Pakistan’s foreign debt used to be about $350m. It now stands at approximately $40bn. The country’s annual balance of trade deficit exceeds $10bn. This deficit may be met by dipping into overseas Pakistanis’ hard-currency remittances and foreign borrowings. Budget deficits are met by resort to the printing press and domestic borrowing. Nobody worries about whether the debts will ever be discharged. I suspect the lending institutions do not even want these debts to be repaid. They are happy to see the borrowers’ obligations mount so long as interest payments continue to flow into their coffers.

Numerous other states are acting the same way. America is the most heavily indebted country in the world. Its foreign debt surpasses that of many other nations put together. As this process goes on, an ever-increasing proportion of a nation’s public revenue goes towards paying the service charges on its domestic and foreign debt, leaving less and less for the delivery of vital services and amenities to its citizens, such as health care and education. This is already happening and it is being justified in the name of globalisation and privatisation.

I don’t know how economists see the future, but as a student of politics my own feeling is that the culture of spending beyond one’s own resources cannot last forever. I think that as more and more individuals approach bankruptcy, and as governments default on payments due and lose credit worthiness (so that no one will lend them any more funds), the prevailing culture and with it the economic system will collapse and spread chaos. The misery these developments cause the ordinary people will probably generate rebellions and bring down the existing political order.

Politics in Punjab – DAWN

WE the Punjabis have never excelled in the art of associating together to pursue the common good. A few relevant cases described below may be of interest.

An unceasing quest for dominance destabilised the Punjab Muslim League and its government within weeks of the country’s establishment. On Aug 16, 1947 Nawab Mamdot, the party’s provincial president, became the chief minister. Mumtaz Daultana, one of the party’s leading men, was taken as a minister in his cabinet. He did not think much of Mamdot’s standing as a landed aristocrat or his abilities as a politician and administrator.

By the end of December the estrangement between the two became widely known and began to create factional divisions in both the administration and the party organisation. Mr Jinnah twice summoned them to Karachi to resolve their differences but his efforts failed. The governor, Sir Francis Mudie, also tried to bring about a reconciliation between them but he too failed.

Mumtaz Daultana resigned his cabinet post in June 1948. In November he ran for the party president’s office against Mamdot’s nominee, Alauddin Siddiqui, and won by a small margin. He proceeded to campaign for Mamdot’s removal as chief minister and got a little more than one half of the party’s MPAs to sign a statement demanding his resignation. Daultana sent word of this statement to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and advised him to dismiss the Mamdot ministry.

Liaquat Ali Khan came to Lahore in January 1949 and Mamdot showed him a statement signed by a majority of the MPAs expressing confidence in him. The prime minister noticed that the names and signatures of several MPAs appeared on both statements.

Instead of asking the governor to call the assembly to session to show whether Mamdot had majority support, he advised the governor general to dismiss the Mamdot ministry, dissolve the assembly, and impose governor’s rule in the province.

The Punjab Muslim League council met on July 24, 1950 but the meeting turned chaotic. Mian Abdul Bari, its president at the time, failed to restore order and left the meeting along with Mamdot and their supporters. Daultana and his supporters stayed on, dismissed Bari and elected Soofi Abdul Hamid, a Daultana nominee, as president. Despondent, Mamdot left the Muslim League and set up a party of his own called the Jinnah Awami Muslim League.

Provincial assembly elections were held in March 1951 which the Punjab Muslim League won with a landslide and elected Daultana as the chief minister. He got the position for which he had resorted to manipulation and intrigue for four years. His dominance in the PML and the government in Punjab would, however, last only a couple of years.

Following the elections of 1970, Punjab emerged as the stronghold of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP. Ahmad Raza Kasuri, one of the party’s founding members, denounced Bhutto’s decision to stay away from the National Assembly session scheduled for March 3, 1971. He tried to set up a faction within the party but eventually left to join Asghar Khan’s Tehrik-i-Istaqlal. Mukhtar Rana, a militant socialist and effective labour leader in Faisalabad, criticised Mr Bhutto’s ‘fascist’ inclinations. He was sent to prison on a charge of inciting violence and, allegedly, died under torture.

Fist fights between PPP factions were reported from several Punjab towns as far back as May 1972. Higher party dignitaries were by no means above factional rivalries. Sheikh Rashid, one of the venerated party elders, was president of the Punjab PPP while Ghulam Mustafa Khar, known to be close to Mr Bhutto, was the secretary general. He, being the domineering type, did not want to work with Rashid who was popular with many of the party leaders and workers. At the beginning of 1972, Khar became Governor of Punjab but retained his party post.

Khar as governor had influence with the provincial police and controlled some of the government patronage. He used these levers, and his reputation as Bhutto’s friend, to harass and dislodge Rashid’s supporters. By May 1973 there was hardly a party branch organisation in Lahore that had any pro-Rashid functionaries.

In a party ‘reorganisation’ in the summer of 1973, Sheikh Rashid lost his position and a Khar nominee, Mohammad Afzal Wattoo, one of the few PPP candidates to have been defeated in the 1970 elections, replaced him. Thus Khar emerged as the effective head of both the government and the party in Punjab. But as in the earlier case of Daultana, his glory would be short-lived: he was forced to resign his post in March 1974.

Coming to more recent times, we saw Shahbaz Sharif and the PML-N members in his cabinet asking the PPP ministers to go away. They argued that since the PML-N had withdrawn from the PPP-led government at the centre, the PPP ministers in Punjab should be nice guys and reciprocate. This was poor reasoning. Nawaz Sharif withdrew his men from the central government because he was unhappy with Asif Zardari, who had gone back on his promise to reinstate the deposed judges. But the PPP ministers in Punjab were not unhappy and had no reason to quit their posts.

It would have been proper for Shahbaz Sharif to throw out the PPP ministers if they had been particularly corrupt or incompetent, or if they had been obstructionists in cabinet meetings. But none of that was alleged. The real reason for the PML-N’s demand has never been revealed. I venture to suggest that it may have been something like the following:

As the recently reported settlement between the two sides tells us, the PPP ministers wanted their share of development funds and jobs, and they wanted their advice concerning the postings and transfers of officials in their areas to be heeded. This would have shown their constituents that they were doing a good job for the folks back home and would incline them to vote for the same aspirants in the next election.

Shahbaz Sharif and company did not want these PPP politicians to win next time. They wanted to replace them with their own people who would use funds and jobs to ingratiate themselves with the PPP’s current voters and defeat that party’s candidates in the next election.

In other words, it was the PML-N’s design to drive the PPP, its main rival, out of Punjab. It is good that eventually wiser counsels prevailed.

Recalling a conspiracy – DAWN

WHEN two or more persons make plans to commit a crime, they may be said to have hatched a conspiracy.

Discussion of the project does not become a conspiracy unless the participants have agreed to carry it out.

It has been said repeatedly in recent weeks that conspiracies are being hatched in the presidency to disrupt the rapport between the PPP and PML-N. If this is indeed happening, the enterprise may be called dirty politics but, strictly speaking, it is not a conspiracy since breaking a rival coalition is not a crime.

We have had only a few known conspiracies in our history. There was the Rawalpindi Conspiracy to overthrow Liaquat Ali Khan’s government in 1951, a conspiracy between President Iskander Mirza and Gen Ayub Khan to dismiss the civilian regime and bring in military rule (1958), and a conspiracy between Gen Yahya Khan and some of his associates to use military force to crush the separatists in East Pakistan (1971). One may also refer to a conspiracy between Gen Ziaul Haq and his commanders to overthrow Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government (1977). Participants in only one of these cases, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, were arrested, tried and convicted. The specifics of this case are not generally known and I should like to share them with readers.

Maj Gen Mohammad Akbar Khan was its author. Born into an affluent Pakhtun family in 1912, he went to Islamia College, Peshawar, after finishing high school, entered the British Indian Army, graduated from the famous Sandhurst Military Academy, returned to the Indian Army as a commissioned officer (1934), fought the Japanese in Burma during World War II, received a gallantry award, and joined the Pakistan Army as a brigadier after independence. He commanded the regular and irregular forces fighting Indian forces in Kashmir, did not approve of the ceasefire and wanted the fighting to continue.

He was greatly dissatisfied with what he considered was the inadequate support the government extended to the Pakistani men fighting in Kashmir. Gen Douglas Gracey, chief of the Pakistan Army at the time, and on his advice the prime minister, did not want the army to get too deeply involved in Kashmir. That is why they were circumspect in their support of the operation.

Akbar Khan was inclined to be impulsive and rather indiscreet, and he talked too much. He freely conveyed his criticism of the government to fellow officers. His wife, Nasim (daughter of the celebrated woman politician Begum Jehan Ara Shahnawaz), was even more of a talker. She too went around criticising the government. Word of their talking eventually reached the intelligence agencies, who began to watch them.

Akbar Khan was nevertheless promoted to the rank of major general in December 1950. Gen Ayub Khan, who was now commander-in-chief, posted him as chief of the general staff at the headquarters, partly to keep an eye on him and partly to keep him away from officers out in the field. This, however, did not stop his tirades against the government. In fact he now began to discuss with friends a plan to overthrow the government.

On Feb 23, 1951 about a dozen officers (ranking from major general to captain) and three civilians met at Akbar Khan’s house. The civilians included Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Syed Sajjad Zaheer (general secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan) and Mohammad Hussain Ata. Akbar Khan presented his plan: Governor General Nazimuddin and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who were expected to be in Rawalpindi during the following week, would be arrested. The governor general would be forced to dismiss the government and install an interim regime headed by Akbar Khan. Elections would be promised but no definite date given. The new regime would set things right (eradicate corruption, provide education, healthcare and other amenities of life to the poor). The meeting lasted more than eight hours, and reportedly the participants agreed that the plan should be implemented.

Akbar Khan had reached an understanding with the Communist Party along the following lines: he would stop the intense persecution to which the party leaders and workers were being subjected at the time, and he would let the party function like any other political organisation. This guarantee included the right to contest elections. In return the party and the trade unions affiliated with it would welcome his government, and The Pakistan Times, of which Faiz Ahmed Faiz was the chief editor, would support it.

A senior police officer in the NWFP, Askar Ali Shah, had been Akbar Khan’s friend and confidant for a time and had known of his opposition to the government. He did not participate in the meeting on Feb 23 but learned of its proceedings, got cold feet, and blurted them out to the provincial IGP. The latter reported them to the governor, who promptly informed the prime minister.

On the morning of March 9, Maj Gen Akbar Khan and three of his co-conspirators, including Faiz, were arrested. Begum Nasim, Sajjad Zaheer and several others were arrested a few days later. They ended up in Hyderabad jail (where a wing had been specially prepared for them) and were tried on the charge of “having conspired to wage war against the king.” A special tribunal consisting of Sir Abdul Rahman of the federal court, Justice Mohammad Sharif of the Lahore High Court and Justice Amir-ud-Din of the Dhaka High Court was constituted to try the accused. The trial began on June 15 and lasted several weeks. A.K. Brohi appeared as the chief prosecutor while Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, Z.H. Lari, and several other well-known lawyers appeared for the defence.

The defence argued that while the accused had met and talked, they had not all agreed to take any action. But two of the conspirators (Col Siddique Raja and Maj Mohammad Yousuf Sethi) turned approvers and were persuaded to testify that the accused had indeed come to an agreement. Gen Akbar Khan and the other officers were sentenced to imprisonment for 12 years but the civilians got away with four years in jail.

‘Enemies of the king’ are usually made reasonably comfortable in prison. Forced solitude gives them time to reflect. Faiz wrote some of his finest poetry during his years in jail. The charge of conspiracy did not lower these men in public esteem, Faiz continued to be honoured after his release and Akbar Khan landed a high post in the national security apparatus in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government.

Will he or won’t he go? – DAWN

COMMENTATORS have discussed the opposition politicians’ campaign to force General Musharraf’s exit from his office and its possible outcomes. They have been considering whether this campaign will succeed and, if it does, what would success mean and entail.

Let us begin with the possibility that the opposition will not achieve its goal. For one thing, it is not united. The larger component within the MMA, the JUI, led by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, does not want to say how far it will go in opposing Musharraf. While a bargain between the general and the maulana is not beyond the realm of possibility, a “deal” between him and Ms Benazir Bhutto has been talk of the town for quite some time. She has been telling American officials to urge him to take her in as a partner in ruling Pakistan. He may not be sure whether her terms are right and the deal would work for him.

In any case, her eagerness to be in his camp weakens very considerably the opposition’s drive. It seems to me that she will jump on to the opposition’s “bandwagon” (or truck) only if and when it becomes clear for all to see that the general’s campaign for a second term is lost.

Until a few weeks ago, the opposition appeared to be rather listless. But since the government’s clumsy handling of the Chief Justice (March 9 and after), its rallies have been attracting large crowds. But it is to be noted that these rallies have been scheduled in conjunction with Justice Chaudhry’s travel plans.

It may then be that the crowds gather to greet the Chief Justice and not so much to applaud Qazi Hussain Ahmad and his associates. They may be shouting anti-Musharraf slogans because they think he has insulted the judiciary. These rallies may not fare as well if the government is wise enough to withdraw the presidential reference against the Chief Justice and, as a result, he returns to his office and functions in the Supreme Court.

The lawyers say they will still carry on their campaign for General Musharraf’s ouster and the restoration of democracy. But it is not unlikely that in the event of Justice Chaudhry’s reinstatement both they and the opposition parties will lose some of their present momentum.

What happens if the opposition’s movement loses steam as the next election approaches? The present assemblies will be asked to elect a president. If General Musharraf has made a deal with the PML-Q to the effect that he will let it rig the election, the party leaders will most probably get him elected.

What will follow? Some observers, including this writer, have been of the view that he and the government he puts together after the election will not be effective. Apathy and disaffection, which have already produced chaos (meaning lawlessness and defiance of the government’s writ) will become more widespread and intense. Musharraf may be aware of this likely outcome, but he may still follow the above course of action, thinking that the “storm” will pass, and that any alternative to his rule will make things worse.

Let us now consider the possibility that he looks for ways of retaining his office without having to rely on the PML-Q and an election rigged to its advantage, It is in this context that the matter of an understanding or a deal with the PPP, and possibly with the JUI, becomes relevant. The real difficulty here does not relate to the court cases pending against Ms Bhutto and her husband. No protest of any consequence will develop if these cases are shelved or withdrawn.

The far more serious question for the general relates to the dimensions of the PPP’s success in the forthcoming election. No one can be sure that it will win a majority of seats in the National Assembly so as to be able to form the next government, or even a large enough plurality to form and lead a coalition government.

The general will have to deal with the political forces that emerge from the election. If the PPP does well enough to form an internally cohesive government or a coalition in which its partners are firmly allied with it, Ms Bhutto will be in a position to ask the president to remain within the bounds the Constitution has prescribed for him and leave the greater part of governance to the prime minister and her/his cabinet. If he accepts this condition, he will no longer be the country’s actual ruler and all his exertions in this regard would have been in vain.

On the other hand, if the PPP’s electoral performance has been modest, the coalition it forms is tenuous and its allies susceptible to seduction from outside, Ms Bhutto can hope to do no more than fill Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain’s shoes (with her daintier feet). She will be free of the harassment she has endured in the past, and she will have an official residence, a fleet of cars, and other perquisites, but she will not have much of ruling authority. Nor can she expect to maintain her present political standing with the organs of civil society and the people at large. This bargain may not be worth the paper it is written on.

The general’s supporters, such as the editor of a Lahore newspaper (June 16, 2007), contend that his continuance in office for a second term is an imperative of the national interest. It would be good if he gave up his army post, held fair and free elections, and did not make questionable deals with PML-Q or any other party.

But in their reckoning his continuance in power would be good for Pakistan even if he did not do any of these things. They think that any combination of politicians that gets to replace him will mess up the country’s affairs. It will not restrain the extremists or maintain law and order, and it will disrupt the economic growth achieved under the present government.

They believe that the restoration of democracy is not as vital a national interest as the continuance of General Musharraf’s progressive policies, and that democracy can wait until the time for its return is more propitious, that is, until political parties in the country have become more capable of operating a democratic political system.

Spokesmen of the United States government support this line of reasoning, but they cannot endorse it quite as unabashedly. They vacillate between opposites. They do not approve of military rule but they must work with General Musharraf, because they think he is their best available agent for suppressing Muslim extremists and militants in the area.

They would feel better if he gave up his army post, but they would let him decide whether and when to do it. They want elections in Pakistan to be free and fair, and they want the general to be elected by the new assemblies for a second term, but if the present assemblies do elect him, and if thereafter the election is rigged to an extent, they will still work with him.

They do not support the case of the general’s supporters. The assertion is not valid that the present regime is doing well, and that the politicians, if they take power, will destroy its accomplishments. That it has failed to control the extremists is evident from the fact that the Taliban have installed themselves as rulers not only in places in our tribal regions but also in parts of settled districts of NWFP, namely, Tank, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan, not to speak of neighbourhoods in Islamabad, the nation’s capital.

The state of law and order is poor throughout the country. There is blatant violation of the law at all levels. Far too many people ignore or oppose the government’s writ. The insurrection in Balochistan, which has been going on for more than two years, shows no sign of abating. Nor does the government have anything to show for itself in Waziristan. It is hard to see how a government made up of elected politicians could make these situations any worse. They may in fact bring about some improvement.

It is also being said that the winners in the next election will be too fragmented and divided to work together as a team, that we will in effect have no real government, and that chaos will result. Let there be chaos, one may say, for out of chaos order will eventually emerge as it has in other places and times. But consider also that we have chaos right now: the present government is ineffective in that hardly anyone pays attention to its directives.

Second, it is quite likely that considerations of self-preservation will motivate the incoming politicians to join hands to forge a government that works. Recall that Mohammad Khan Junejo put together a reasonably stable and effective government following a “partyless” election, in which everyone had contested, at least formally, as an independent candidate.

Equally disingenuous is the suggestion that the restoration of democracy should wait until political institutions in the country have become mature and competent. This is a counsel of despair, meaning that we need not ever have democracy.

It cannot be over-emphasised that democracy becomes embedded in a political culture only if the people concerned have had the opportunity to practise it for an extended period of time, a period of trial and error, during which they learn from experienced. But the military in this country does not let the people have this learning experience.

Moreover, every time it seizes the government, it goes out of its way to debilitate political parties, legislatures, and organs of civil society, if it has not outlawed politics altogether. A way must be found to send the military back to the barracks and keep it there if political institutions in Pakistan are ever to gain maturity and develop adequacy.